Tomahawks and Tensions: How U.S. Missile Aid Risks a New Escalation in the Ukraine War

The Alaska summit (15/08/2025) raised hopes that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, could bring an end to the war in Ukraine. With an optimistic, yet measured prospect, it initially seemed as if a new era for Russia-Ukraine and Russia-NATO relations could emerge and that there could be an opportunity for peace, or at least a further development to diplomatic talks. However, this did not materialise, and the war now appears to be as inconclusive as ever. Moreover, the US risks severe escalation with the Russian Federation over the supplying of Tomahawk missiles to the armed forces of Ukraine.  

This article will address the key issues around this new phase of critical escalation and address the threats to both Russia and NATO/Ukraine. First, what is a Tomahawk? According to Raytheon Technologies, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile [TLAM] is a highly effective ‘precision weapon that launches from ships, submarines, and ground launchers and can strike targets precisely from 1,000 miles away’ (RTX. 2025). It is a highly lethal and precise cruise missile. Concerningly, the rising possibility for Ukraine to be supplied with high precision strike cruise missiles, paired with further US involvement, can logically only lead to one outcome: escalation. To this extent, even the mere prospect of supply is in of itself, a topic of securitisation.  

The lethality of the TLAM system, is due to its utilitarian applicability, in that it can be launched from a wide variety of sites This inherent adaptability and its vast range of capabilities to engage, poses to be a severe thorn in the Kremlin’s side and its ambitions over the war.  Despite prior NATO armaments, including the famed HIMAR rocket system, having proven invaluable to Kiev in the ongoing war, these systems have also been somewhat limited in the distinct adherence to one single domain of combat, for example ground forces. 

 Yet with the invaluable range of possible deployments, the TLAM system may give Ukraine the level of adaptability it needs to, if not out-gun, then at least tactically deter further engagement. It would enable Kiev to compensate for reduced capacity/conditional capacity, in exchange for flexibility via the opportunity to use smart power and multiple geographies to use as launching points for tactical strikes.  

The TLAM also comes in a range of specified variants, for differing purposes. Currently the ‘Bock 5’ comes in three variants: the standard ‘Block 5’, the ‘Block 5a’ and the ‘Block 5b’, with a and b models being capable of striking mobile ocean targets and hit more specific land targets respectively (RTX. 2025).  

Considering this, there are two key additional points of importance to explore, to gain a full overview of the unfolding situation:  

Firstly, as previously mentioned, is the rising level of armaments, which, logically can only lead to further escalation. Russia will become increasingly likely to resort to more severe levels of strike capacity, such as the long-range RS-28. This escalator stance is starkly echoed by both President Putin and Kremlin Spokesman Dimitri Peskov, with the former reporting that the level supply of such long-range ballistics would bring on a “qualitatively new stage of escalation” (the Guardian.2025). 

Secondly through a broad macro-political process, we are witnessing, not only a re-arming of Europe, but a metamorphosis of European and NATO defence structure and policy. With the ever-increasing invocation of Article 4 of the NATO charter, via violation of member airspace from Russian drones (notably in the case of Poland), the structure of NATO and European defence policy must alter. 

In this instance the possibility of an ‘Iron Dome’ akin air defence system may be a path forward. As Finish PM Petteri Orpo notes, ‘Russia represents a “permanent threat” to European security’ (Ross. 2025). With such an existential security threat, it is vital that Washington does in fact provide Kiev with the ‘weapons it needs to defend itself and bring Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table’ (Ibid).

Despite all of this, these developments/escalations rely on one key caveat: will the US in fact supply Ukraine with TLAMs? Currently, it is not clear, especially in regard to capacity to supply. Since 2022, the US has only acquired 202 TLMAs, yet in 2024 alone used 124 of them which as noted by the Financial Times 2025, poses a logistical imbalance, impacting the supply chain to Kiev. 

To conclude, whilst there is still a degree of uncertainty over the prospect of US TLAM supply to Kiev, if the proposal develops is fully realised, this may hold drastic ramifications for the ambitions of the Kremlin and the war. Since their initial introduction in 1991, during Operation Desert storm, they have proven to be highly effective and capable, with over 2,300 Tomahawks having been fired since January of 1991 (NAVAIR. 2025). This proven capability of the TLAMs, in combination with the escalator consequences of their supply puts Ukraine and NATO at a crossroads. This dilemma is vital and is a deeply ‘pivotal moment in Ukraine’s more than three-year war’ (Ross. 2025). 

Sources:

RTX (2025). Tomahawk Cruise Missile. [online] www.rtx.com. Available at: https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/sea/tomahawk-cruise-missile. [Accessed 18 Oct. 2025].

Sabbagh, D. (2025). What are Tomahawk missiles and why does Ukraine want them? [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/17/what-are-tomahawk-missiles-and-why-does-ukraine-want-them. [Accessed 19 Oct. 2025].

Miller, C., Chávez, S. and Foy, H. (2025). Welcome To Zscaler Directory Authentication. [online] Ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/654a4d90-8b49-4aff-a05c-fc7a9f842432. [Accessed 19 Oct. 2025].

NAVAIR (2025). Tomahawk | NAVAIR. [online] www.navair.navy.mil. Available at: https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/Tomahawk. [Accessed 20 Oct. 2025].

Ross, T. (2025). Finland to Trump: Now let Zelenskyy hit Russia with Tomahawks. [online] POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/tomahawks-finland-donald-trump-russia-ukraine-cruise-missiles-sanctions-war/. [Accessed 23 Oct. 2025].